Nick Jackson, head of consulting and Richard Nott, manager, compliance and engineering service of Lloyds Register explain the pervasive effect Piper Alpha had on the offshore industry.
What immediate impact did Piper Alpha have on the industry?
The Piper Alpha tragedy forced a wide-ranging review of safety offshore. In particular, the need to ensure that equipment was appropriate to the particular major accident hazard scenarios applicable to a specific installation – as opposed to simply complying with pre-existing prescriptive legislation.
Principles of inherent safety were established – the layout and positioning of escape routes, muster points and temporary refuge in relation to the main sources of hazard were of particular focus. The provision and rating of blast walls and passive fire protection arrangements also came under significant scrutiny.
Did the industry re-examine escape procedures?
The impact continues to be highly significant and goes well beyond the provision of robust procedures, training and equipment. The Cullen Report into the disaster made numerous recommendations relating to escape and evacuation which ultimately resulted in the implementation of the PFEER regulations.
PFEER requires offshore operators to implement and maintain structured risk-based systems and competencies aimed at securing an installation’s systems in the event of an emergency. The offshore legislative climate now demands greater scrutiny of emergency provisions and standards.
The real impact has been the evolution of societal expectations and behaviour at an organisational and individual level. Acceptable norms have changed – the offshore workforce will no longer tolerate any risk they perceive as less than acceptable.
Has Lloyds Register contributed to safer environments for rig workers?
As Independent Verification Body for the majority of installations in the UK Sector, Lloyd’s Register EMEA has been at the forefront of developments in these areas.
We have worked alongside duty-holders in re-examining the safety provision on their existing installations and with operators, design contractors, equipment suppliers and fabricators to help ensure that, in design and operation, the right equipment is provided in the right places to ensure the major accident hazard prevention goals of the installation’s safety cases are achieved.
What standards now govern the types of equipment and safety training operators must provide?
In the UK sector – and in other areas where the safety case methodology has been adopted as best-practice – the types and quality of safety equipment is governed by codes and standards which demonstrate that the equipment will be suitable for the specific circumstances of an installation.
Â
As offshore resources become ever harder to reach, reservoir pressures and temperatures increase, well fluids become increasingly hazardous and the technology required to extract these resources becomes ever more sophisticated, this approach will ensure that the safety equipment provided matches the pace of development and increasing hazard.
Has the tragic outcome helped bring about positive change in the industry?
Absolutely – the impact was global and ripples were felt well beyond the offshore oil and gas industry. Industry and public awareness of the disaster remains high and remains pertinent today.
The Safety Case has become a common norm and an organisation’s ability to manage major accident hazards is scrutinised and measured continuously. The tragedy of Piper Alpha – the failure of so many to safely escape from the burning platform – contributed to an exodus of personnel from the industry.
Everyone has worked incredibly hard to improve technical and operational safety, including a focus on relationships, communications and co-operation between the workforce and offshore leadership. Empowering workers to influence risk and safety has contributed to a positive change in safety culture.
What were the most significant lessons from piper alpha?
Understanding Risk. The full consequences of the Piper Alpha disaster were not adequately understood prior to the event. Hazard identification and risk assessment techniques were inadequate, and therefore the risk controls applied were insufficient to control the major explosions and fires that occurred.
These lessons from the disaster are largely reflected in the offshore legislative standards now applied in the UKCS, and coupled with robust management systems and competence requirements, enable operators to make their ‘case for safety’ in a structured and practical process.
Communications. The tragedy highlighted huge failings in organisational communications. Communications between shifts, teams and co-workers; between offshore installations; and with the beach all failed during the disaster.
Communication continues to be a key focus of industry Step Change initiatives, and we are making huge strides in providing access to information, setting up networks, establishing communications systems, and creating cultures to support open and honest communication
RELATED LINKS: Piper Alpha, Fire In The Night
