Keep the pipes flowing

“Shell Nigeria’s Security Policy and Security Management System enables it to identify, evaluate and manage security risks in our operations, while respecting human rights.”

Today, thanks to the introduction of new technologies, effective maintenance management is increasing operators’ ability to increase the efficiency pipeline transportation. By way of example Saudi Aramco has around 1.4 million items of equipment across its 17 000 km of pipelines.

However, challenges remain not least due to the inherent unpredictability of many of the events that can undermine a pipeline’s efficient operation. Firstly, there is sabotage or terrorism carried out either simply for economic need (fuel poverty in Nigeria, for example) or in protest at a particular company’s operations or as part of a politically motivated action campaign.

The UK, for example announced in January 2007 that it was to use military police to guard the important Bacton gas terminal against a terrorist attack, while Saudi Arabia said in May 2007 that it had arrested over 150 militants who were alleged to have been conspiring to attack the Kingdom’s energy installations specifically pipelines.

Also, in July 2006, Russia’s Gazprom was permitted by the government to set up armed forces to protect its pipelines. Last September Mexico’s Pemex announced that it had increased security measures at strategic installations in the country following a series of bombings at some of its fuel pipelines across the country. 

As mentioned above, one energy producing country, Nigeria, demonstrates how vulnerable oil and gas producers can be to a concerted campaign of sabotage. The country’s Niger Delta has seen many years of civil unrest aimed mainly at Royal Dutch Shell’s activities in the area protesting at both the company’s presence and also the Nigerian government, which activists perceive to be unfairly distributing national income from oil and gas operations.

Attacks in early 2006 managed to shut down one fifth of Nigerian crude production and the threat remains a problem today. In May 2007 a militant group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta carried out several attacks on oil facilities and pipelines and also abducted foreign workers.

But it’s not just sabotage that can be a problem in Nigeria. In May 2006 more than 200 people died when a pipeline exploded in a Lagos suburb after people had attempted to tap into it to syphon off fuel. In 1998, over 1 000 people were killed in an explosion at the town of Jesse in the Delta state, and in the years since then, over 1 000 people have died in several incidents in the Delta, Lagos and in Abia state.

Shell Nigeria reported that in 2006 as well as what it terms “community disruptions” there were 89 incidents of crude oil theft resulting in an estimated average crude oil loss of between 16 000 and 24 000 barrels per day (bpd) compared to between 20,000 and 40 000 bpd in 2005. Community related disruptions were down from 154 in 2005 to 117 in 2006 but increased in severity with 12.1 million barrels of oil deferred in the year compared to 3.6 million barrels in 2005.

This increase was due, in part, to the attacks by militant groups. The decline in criminal incidents since 2004 was reversed in 2006, with 390 incidents, up 75% on 2005. Forty-seven incidents involved the use of arms, up from 15 in 2005.

As a result, it has tried to improve the way it manages security issues at pipelines and other infrastructure it operates in Nigeria. It has a Security Standard, which ensures security is managed consistently across the world and “forms part of internal control processes.” Shell Nigeria’s Security Policy and Security Management System enables it “to identify, evaluate and manage security risks in our operations, while respecting human rights.” Shell has two categories of security personnel in Nigeria.

The Nigeria Police Force deploys a corps of its Supernumerary constabulary to guard Shell Nigeria’s assets, facilities and staff. There is also a Joint Task Force – comprising the army, navy and police deployed by the government.

The US also has adopted a plan to protect its pipeline system that covers some 165 000 miles. In the US oil pipelines account for 17% of all domestic freight moved nationwide, delivering more than 14 billion barrels a year. The pipeline network is regulated from a safety and environmental perspective by the federal government by the US Department of Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety.

In the US pipeline operators have cooperated with the federal government to identify, for preparedness purposes, those pipeline facilities deemed critical. The Department has published a series of guidelines, which are being implemented by operators. It has also introduced a list of recommendations, which include:

• Identify and analyse actual and potential events that can result in pipeline security related incidents

• Identify the likelihood and consequence of such events

• Provide means for examining and evaluating risks and selecting risk reduction actions

• Establish and track security plan effectiveness

• Establish security conditions and specific protective measures based on the threat level

• The security of pipeline facilities has to be evaluated in relationship to other energy assets.

The pipeline industry in the US is now developing an industry standard for the protection of control functions and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisitions Systems (SCADA). As well as the physical security of pipeline facilities, the industry is also evaluating the potential vulnerabilities of Information Technology (IT) systems, process control and data exchange from the pipeline to the control center.

The industry has conducted a review of the SCADA standards for other industries, and is currently drafting a SCADA security standard for all pipelines.

This type of safety management system is relevant for all possible threats to a pipeline’s operation, including for example earthquakes. In few countries is this more relevant than Japan where, for example, the 1995 Kobe earthquake caused some of the most serious damage to submerged gas pipelines.

This resulted in Tokyo Gas and the US’ Cornell University carrying out the largest experimental facility of its kind ever constructed to see exactly what happens when the earth moves violently against an underground line. The results were then used to draw up an earthquake-resistance design code for gas pipelines in Japan.

The company now uses seismic movement identification technology called SIGNAL which performs damage estimation of a natural gas network based on extensive earthquake monitoring and uses this information for the decision-making whether or not to shut off medium-pressure gas supply.

It also has in place other safety measures such as automated shut-off valves. Unfortunately, the location for a pipeline cannot always avoid earthquake prone areas as the recently opened (May 2006) Baku Tblisi Ceyhan pipeline demonstrates as it follows a highly active earthquake fault line in northern Turkey.

This area has seen some 17 major earthquakes since 1924 measuring between 5.5 and 7.9 on the Richter scale. BP, which headed the consortium that built the pipeline, made sure that it crossed the fault lines at an optimised angle so that it could move and bend during any tremors.
 

For pipelines that pass through earthquake prone zones, early warning systems are key. New advances in monitoring technology mean alarms can be sent much more quickly today than in the past and are particularly relevant for offshore pipelines which cannot be inspected as easily and where leaks can have an even more damaging effect than onshore.

Another major pipeline, the Trans-Alaska system, also runs through an area of high seismic activity. This area saw the world’s second largest earthquake ever in 1964 measuring 9.2 on the Richter Scale.

But modern engineering can help limit the risk as was born out in November 2002 when the Denali Fault slipped 5.5 meters laterally and more than 1 metre vertically underneath the pipeline during a 7.9 Richter Scale earthquake. However, no oil was spilled as a result of the incident as the operator had incorporated a design using Teflon sliders, which allowed the pipeline to flex and the ground to slide beneath it.

Technological developments particularly in IT are helping pipeline operators manage their lines better because many that have been in the ground for several years are now deteriorating.

The US National Transportation Safety Board recently issued a set of recommendations to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration based on a study of several serious incidents during the past decade. These include requiring pipeline operators to install computer-based leak detection systems on pipelines, as well as including simulators for recognition of abnormal operating conditions, in particular, leak events.

This kind of practice has yet to be established on a global basis, but it has been reported that several national pipeline operators associations are considering forming some kind of global body that would oversee all aspects of safe pipeline operation.

Until then, however, it will be up to the individual operator to ensure that the pipelines are kept running safely and efficiently.